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Introduction
The practices of contemporary sovereign states, such as the increasingly ubiquitous
investment in the policing and walling of borders, appear to be paradoxical. As Wendy Brown
argues in Walled States Waning Sovereignty, the claim that the Westphalian model of clearly
demarcated nation states is no longer applicable, nor desirable, is met by the growing
pervasiveness of xenophobic policy.1 Contemporary political theory has become increasingly
interested in the conclusion that political sovereignty, at least as it has previously been known,
has reached its political horizon. Whether citing trends of globalization or democratization,
political theorists and scientists alike have projected beyond this political horizon the fantasy (or
night mare) of a world without borders. Brown writes, “We have learned, especially from late
twentieth-century Continental thought, to keep our eye on power’s discursive dross, its
noncentralized habitus, its noncommodifiable operation and its deterritorialization”2. Some take
the growth of international systems of cooperation, and the dissolution of previous barriers to
cooperation to be signs of a universal political community. Others see them as omens of a new
political empire, operating through increasingly incorporeal yet deadly relations of power.
Regardless, both fantasies are “perversely answered by the stark physicalism of walls”3.
The phenomenon of exceptionalism is analogous to this paradox. Exceptionalism is the
normalization of the exception. It describes when the exception to the law, or the exception to the
norm is subjected codification, or are asserted and validated as norms. States and subjects begin
to identify with their exceptionality, despite the fact exceptionality is valuable because it
signifies one’s capacity or ability to exceed the norms through which states and subjects are
identified. Certainly there is a distinction between the law and the norm, yet I would argue that
1
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one result of state exceptionalism is that the law is increasingly treated as a norm. I find postcolonial and queer theorist Jasbir Puar’s definition of exceptionalism to be instructive. Puar
writes that “exceptionalism paradoxically signals distinction from (to be unlike, dissimilar) as
well as excellence (imminence, superiority), suggesting a departure from yet master of linear
progress”4. In fact, exceptionalism attempts to link superiority over and applicability within
norms, without eroding the distinction between the two. Exceptionalism can be demonstrated by
both state’s and individual subjects. The logic of exceptionalism, like many contemporary
sovereign practices appears conceptually problematic because it is often asserted in terms of the
norms whose legibility it threatens. Nevertheless, exceptionalism can be an effective way of
maintaining sovereignty if states and subjects can effectively position themselves in the liminal
space between the exception and the norm. I aim to show how markers of political progress, such
as democracy and diasporic identity, which denote a moving beyond investment in strict
articulations of identity and sovereignty, have become employed as shibboleths of culture and
politics5. I wish to link these perversions of progressive politics to the question of sovereignty’s
persistence, a fact called into question by the normalization of different states of exception.
These states of exception are perhaps most famously theorized by political philosopher Giorgio
Agamben. In this paper I explore the politics of exceptionalism. How does it work? What work
does it do? How might we critique exceptionalism, and what problems are encountered in an
attempt to do so? In response to these questions, I will argue that exceptionalism is effective for
the very reason that it erodes the intelligibility of those norms through which states and subjects
tend to assert themselves, and through which critiques of sovereign practices tend to be lodged.
Exceptionalism is also strategic because it challenges modern theories of the individual and
4
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sovereign subject, because it challenges the assumption that sovereignty is intrinsic to the
integrity of both. I will argue, however, that this fact is not natural to sovereignty, as some
theorists argue, but rather is constituted by certain normative structures that are historically and
politically specific.
When the Israeli state fosters lawlessness in the name of securing law at its border, or
when it “defends democracy” through state practices that abuse human and political rights, these
actions demonstrate just a few paradoxes ubiquitous to ascendancy of state exceptionalism.
Consequently, the practices of the state, like those practices of sovereignty and identity observed
by Puar, assert the sovereignty of a legal, cultural, and political, totality in ways, erode integrity
of those legal, cultural, and political norms, despite the fact that they continue to profit from the
legibility lent to them by these norms. In the case of the Israeli state, where sovereignty is
increasingly articulated according to cultural norms (as Jewish Israeli) and political norms (as
“liberal” and “democratic”), these two manifestations of exceptionalism cannot be separated.
I say “strategic” because in many ways this paper will be concerned with tactics. I
identify exceptionalism to be highly strategic partially for the reason that it incorporates into its
own operations the threat or promise of its own dissolution. In this sense, sovereignty
increasingly operates by playing with its own chronology, by making its future dissolution or
present incompleteness a norm of its operations. I find that Israeli sovereignty appears to operate
and condition itself through the threat of its own dissolution, or through the promise of a more
just form of statehood. In both cases marginalized subjects are blamed for the state’s inability to
conform to legal and political norms that they have already exceeded6. As I will show, this
dynamic renders it difficult to etch out a space for effective critique.
For many of the thinkers discussed in this paper, and for Giorgio Agamben in particular,
6
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it is the site of the legal indistinction between the law and exception that most clearly
demonstrates how political sovereignty operates7. For Agamben, the fact that sovereignty
operates on its own threshold demonstrates the fundamental mode of political sovereignty. The
Agambenian sovereign acts in ways that confound theories of the natural and unitary subject, and
yet, despite this, Agamben tends to reduce politically and historically specific phenomena to
abstract metaphysical qualities. Agamben helps to describe the efficacy of sovereignty as it
operates through exceptionalism. In doing so he precludes any practice through which
exceptionalism could be effectively combated in ways that are problematically teleological and
apolitical.
I will be mostly employing theorists who tend to be lumped into the category of the
“post-structural.” For them, as for Agamben, contemporary sovereignty disproves modern
theories of the individual and collective subject, demonstrating how sovereignty operates through
the incomplete, disjointed, enactive, and “roguish” subject8. Exceptionalism appears to be a
necessary development correlative to the problems incurred by any attempt to maintain the
sovereignty of a homogeneous entity. Sovereignty requires, paradoxically, as a political
imperative, the interorization of that which is excluded supposedly for the sake of maintaining
sovereignty.9 As a result, the sovereignty of the law and the sovereignty specific cultural or
political identities remain haunted by a perverse intimacy with that which is excluded, and that
which is posed as a threat to their existence. However, these writers distinguish themselves from
Agamben, insofar as exceptionalism remains a political tactic and achievement, not a natural fact
of politics, nor a natural quality of sovereignty.
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Many of these theorists advocate for practices of sovereignty and identity that challenge
reliance on the determinate and complete subject, understanding those transgressions to already
the mode through which the sovereignty of subjects is maintained. Thus, claims of personal and
collective sovereignty remain important and potentially radical claims because the legal and
political sovereignty to wish they lay claim is already operating outside the boundaries of those
norms10. For these writers, the thematics of the post-structural subject mark the sites where
existing power relations can be subverted, and yet they also mark the site of their persistence. As
such, it becomes increasingly important recognize the risk involved in theorizing along these
lines (a risk that they do seem to be aware of). It is important to recognize the larger historical
and economic factors of Israeli sovereignty that cannot necessarily be dislodged through
practices which attempt to play with the intimacy between subversion and subjection or to
embrace the precarity of political subjecthood and sovereignty already included within its
continued mobilization. There is, after all, a huge difference between the resistance offered
against Israeli and Palestinian claims to personal and collective sovereignty given that
Palestinians and Israeli’s experience dramatically greater levels of privilege and freedom in
relation to the law, and in relation to cultural and political norms. This difference may implicate,
among other things, the dictates of global capitalism or the long histories of violence and
oppression. Much of the thought that I am engaging has the tendency or at least the potential to
obfuscate this difference. Through the work of Palestinian critic Joseph Massad, I hope to push
back somewhat against the ethos of these tactics, while still affirming their critical edge.11
In my analysis of exceptionalism I will be guided by a series of smaller questions.
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What are the risks already present when one makes a claim in response to exceptionalism?
Consequently, what are the risks of critical theory in this context, and how are those risks
distributed according to the, greater structural factors that effect but are not necessarily immanent
to individual, and even collective, political practices. Each section tackles a different marker of
Israeli sovereignty that also signifies a site of Israeli exceptionalism. The first section will be
interested in the Israeli laws that more and appear to operate as norms in the face of state
exceptionalism. The second section will discuss cultural norms, and the third section will discuss
political norms, and in particular, the Israeli state’s self-identification as “democratic.” Each
section engages political philosophy that challenges the determinacy of those markers on which
sovereignty is supposedly contingent, explain how sovereignty persists through this
indeterminacy, and finally reflect on the prospects for effectively critiquing contemporary
sovereign practices. These theorists include but are not limited to Giorgio Agamben, Wendy
Brown, Joseph Massad, Edward Said, and Jacques Derrida.

9
Chapter 1
Juridical Exceptionalism and Fickle Partitions: Israeli Sovereignty as Operating in
Relation to the Law

Juridical markers of Israeli sovereignty are undermined by the actual operations of Israeli
sovereignty, and yet they remain the signs under which that sovereignty is presented legible. The
Israeli state’s attempt to assert its sovereignty illegally and to justify those assertions under some
legal obligation to its own citizens, or at least to some of its citizens, mocks the very determinacy
of those legal distinctions that are meant to separate Israel from the Palestinian authority.12 The
material structures built in the name of the sovereignty of Israeli law, and in the name of Israel’s
sovereign boundaries, effect that sovereignty for the very reason that those effects exceed the
legal and territorial borders they are meant to mark and defend. What I am describing here is the
dynamic of exceptionalism. By accusing Israel of “exceptionalism” I mean to highlight the
capacity of the Israeli state and Israeli subjects to position themselves on the indeterminate space
between the exception and law so as to remain unaccountable to the norms of either. It is from
this position that Israel works to normalize multiple spaces of exception to the law while
retaining the conceit of exceptionality.
As scholars Michaeli and Naftali observe, the actions of the Israel state, as an occupying
state are not so “exceptional” if one takes into account the already existing concept of a “legal
occupation” within international legal discourse.13 The ambiguities of legal discourse allow the
Israeli state to articulate its sovereignty both within and without its legal obligations to an
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international community. This is not to say that international law is not meaningful, or that it
exists purely and inevitably to maintain the conceit of Israel’s lawfulness. Rather, whatever
legibility or legitimacy can be accessed through international law is appropriated by the Israeli
state to present their illegal actions as exceptional, despite and in service of those structures
which make indeterminate the boundaries and limits of Israeli law. “Israel,” they observe
“enjoys in the occupied Palestinian territory both the powers of an occupier and the powers of a
sovereign, while the Palestinians enjoy neither the rights of an occupied people nor the rights of
citizenship. This indeterminacy thus, allows Israel to avoid the wrath of the international
community for having illegally annexed the territory while pursuing the policies of “greater
Israel” without jeopardizing its Jewish majority”14. Consequently, Palestinians are placed in a
double bind in relation to the law. If it is in the name of the sovereignty of the law that Israeli
perpetuates extralegal actions, and if it is in the name of the distinction between the lawful and
the lawless that Israel disrupts the very distinction between them, what effective recourse should
Palestinians take in relation to the law? For Israelis, the partitions that signify the distinction
between inside and outside, and the distinction between law and exception actually mark the
sites where Israeli citizens are insulated by and simultaneously freed from that very distinction.
Inversely for Palestinians these sites mark the experience of being made accountable to that
which already excludes them. When I discuss forms of cultural and political exceptionalism, I
will also point to this quality of partition. I find that Israeli and Palestinian spaces overlap in
ways which effect and maintain structural violence against Palestinians. Correlatively,
Palestinians are condemned for a fragmented political subject hood and sovereignty for which
the Israeli state is at least partially responsible. Meanwhile Israelis are licensed to transgress the
boundaries of political subjecthood and sovereignty, often in the name of those boundaries on
14
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which sovereignty is supposedly contingent.
Just as Israeli law is applied selectively both within and without what is officially
recognized as Israeli territory, so too is sovereignty selectively enacted both within and without
Israeli legal structures. The relationship between the Israeli state and Palestinians in East
Jerusalem is a good example of this. The separation wall has annexed East Jerusalem. The wall
snakes around Palestinian communities in an attempt to take as much land and as few
Palestinians as possible. In the process the borders of Israel’s self-proclaimed capital continue to
expand into occupied territory. Palestinians living in this annexed territory are excluded from
Israeli citizenship. Further, because they reside in annexed territory they are also excluded the
slight protections that would be granted to them by Palestinian citizenship.15 Instead of
citizenship they are granted the precarious title of “temporary resident.” The Palestinian resident
of East Jerusalem appears to exhibit an exceptional and temporary relationship to government
and legal structures. It is this indeterminacy that privileges the livelihood of Israeli settlers, while
it makes precarious the livelihood of Palestinians. Further, the state attempts to license the
permanence of structures such as checkpoints or the separation wall, through these forms of
indeterminate and temporary subjecthood. In the case of East Jerusalem, the Israeli government
is certainly serious about removing Palestinians from the land. It is the “temporary” presence of
Palestinians within Israeli occupied territory that serves as a managed threat to Israeli
sovereignty: this exposes Palestinians to the unlawful actions of the Israeli state. The institutions
of surveillance and control, built in order to handle this problem of ambiguous citizenship,
maintain the status of Palestinians as subjects to Israeli sovereignty while excluding Palestinians
from the citizenship that is extended to Israelis made easily accessible to the entire Jewish

15

Tawil-Souri, Helga. "Uneven Borders, Coloured (Im)mobilities: ID Cards in Palestine/Israel." Geopolitics 17, no.
1 (2012): 158

12
diaspora. This dynamic of exclusive inclusion, as we will see in other forms of exceptionalism,
operates quite discriminately as a practice of both subjection and subversion in relation to the
limits of the law and to the limits of citizenship.16
Exceptionalism is effective partially because it normalizes a double standard in how the
law applies to Israelis and Palestinians. This double standard operates in a condition of legal
indeterminacy characterized by architectural theorist Eyal Weizman as a state of “temporary
permanence”17. Under this condition the opening up of Palestinians to the force of Israeli law
overlaps with the insulation awarded to Israelis by the law. This is especially the case regarding
the settlement infrastructure of the West Bank. In the early stages of the post-1967 settlement
boom, the annexation of land for settlement and occupation was declared legal so long as
settlements reflected a temporary incursion into foreign territory in response to a temporary
security risk.18 It was the very conceit of a temporary occupation, of a “legal” occupation, which
nourished the permanence of an illegal presence in foreign territory. In 1978, a justice of the
Israeli high court defended the legality of an accelerating and increasingly permanent
infrastructure of settlement and occupation on the grounds of its temporariness, stating, “the
possession itself may one day come to an end as a result of international negotiations which
could end in a new arrangement that will gain force under international legal in attempt to speak
generally to the relationship between Israeli articulations of sovereign law”19. In the case of
settlement and occupation, legality and extralegality become co-constitutive, producing
indeterminacy between the law and the exception to the law through which sovereignty is
asserted. Adi Ophir and Ariella Azoulay comment on the logic of temporary permanence, as that
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which allows sovereign authorities to incorporate the threat or promise of an end to occupation
as justification for its persistence: “Temporariness is now the law of occupation…occupier, is an
unrestrained, almost boundless sovereign, because when everything is temporary almost
anything, any crime, any form of violence is acceptable, because the temporariness seemingly
grants it a license, the license of the state of emergency”20.
Israeli occupation is defended as a response to exceptional circumstances, and yet this
justification serves to maintain indeterminacy between the exception and the law through which
Israeli sovereignty is asserted. Weizman writes that, “When the settlement activity seemed to
degenerate into complete chaos it was because this chaos was often promoted from the centre.
Actual or claimed loss of control in the Occupied territories thus itself became an effective
government strategy. The appearance of being out of control allowed the state to achieve its
ideological objectives without accepting responsibility for them.”21 The Israeli state justifies its
complicity with settler vigilantism on the basis of its legal obligation to its citizens, but because
these Settlers were presented as in some way outside the domain of the Israeli sovereign, the
government continues to act as though it is not equally responsible for that vigilantism.22
Inversely, Palestinians are abandoned by the law at the same time that they are violently
subjugated to the force of the law. This double abandonment and intrusion operates in the name
of a distinction between the lawful and the exceptional that the Israeli state has already exceeded.
This juridical flexibility is maintained through an infrastructure of occupation, through which
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sovereignty is asserted in response to an indeterminacy that is partially engendered by those
structures.23
There exists a network of “temporary” structures of governmentality that consists of
checkpoints, racialized surveillance and identification systems, and physical walling. These
systems reify rather than untangle a situation of overlapping political geographies.24 Thus, it is
necessary, as Sari Hanafi and Eyal Weizman have argued, to observe apartheid and partition in
the OPT as operating 3-dimensionally25. Settlements are often built on hilltops above Palestinian
communities, and are connected by a series of roadways that bypass the structures of occupation
below. What may appear to be an indeterminacy on a two dimensional plane is actually a much
more strategic form of partition. It is one that appropriates and projects a picture of geographical
indeterminacy in order to effect a much more flexible form of partition. In past peace
negotiations, the Israel government has conceded that “it is no longer possible to draw a
continuous line that separates Palestinians from Israelis” and has opted to grant Palestinians
more sovereignty over the territorial surface in exchange for full sovereignty over the subspace
and soil.26 Indeed, apartheid already operates along vertical space as settlements are increasingly
built on hilltops, connected by a complex network of highways inaccessible to Palestinians.
These highways cruelly mock the network of checkpoints they bypass. This network of
checkpoints violently fragments Palestinian communities for the sake of Israeli safety.27
Consequently, Israelis living in the occupied territories live insulated from Palestinian
communities, while they are continually able to cite the “presence” of Palestinians as that which
23
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necessitates the greater construction of biopolitical systems of surveillance and control, systems
that already exclude Israeli settlers.
The fact that both Israelis and Palestinians are often placed in a liminal space between the
exception and law makes it difficult to discern whether an effective critique of, or resistance to,
contemporary forms of Israeli sovereignty should come from within or without the law. I believe
that Giorgio Agamben’s sovereign describes the kind of exceptionalism I have observed in the
operation of Israeli sovereignty. These qualities call into question the notion of sovereignty as
operating fully and naturally according to certain preconceived metaphysical presuppositions,
despite the fact that Agamben tries to explain exceptionalism as intrinsic to sovereignty. Still, he
maintains the capacity of the sovereign to transgress certain existential boundaries. This is
problematic insofar as it endows the sovereign with tactics that are not in contest, and thus
cannot be appropriated for the sake of counter tactics. Consequently, I wish to expose the limits
of Agamben’s metaphysical account of sovereignty and the exception, which, because
sovereignty is treated as a thing, rather than a practice, seems immune to effective critique.
For Giorgio Agamben, exceptionalism, or, the operation of sovereignty in the
indistinction between the exception and the law, is the fundamental mode of sovereignty’s
operations. Agamben, like Schmitt,28 believes that in order for sovereignty to operate above the
law, there consequently must be an intimacy between the law and that which exceeds the law.29
This is the paradox of sovereignty that explains the impossibility of both separating and
collapsing the distinction between the law and the exception. Following this, Agamben places as
distinct and prior to the law the liminal space between it and the exception. He writes, “the state
of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes the order but rather the situation that results from
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its suspension.”30 Agamben paints a picture of distorted space and time, where the sovereign
operates outside of its own existential terms. In this condition, sovereignty operates both outside
itself and in a sense prior to or generally out of step with itself. He argues that the law cannot be
reduced to the exception, although the exception remains always present within the law for the
sake of the law’s ability to operate. The law continues to assert itself as a presence, even as it
necessarily asserts itself outside of itself. But where is it possible to locate, and thus critique or
challenge sovereignty in this picture? By what markers is it possible to identify the sovereign in
this condition? Agamben’s theory of sovereignty remains decisionistic although it is not always
clear who/what is making the decision. He writes, “The sovereign, who is outside the law,
declares that there is nothing outside the law.”31 The implication is that sovereignty operates by
taking its own existence, or rather the question of its existence as an object of its operations. The
fact that it is difficult to locate sovereignty in this picture perhaps speaks to the capacity of states,
such as the Israeli state, to articulate sovereignty selectively both within and without the law.
The sovereign assertion requires the self-sacrifice of the law. This self-immolation is
necessarily enacted in order to bring about the exception. Agamben writes, “The exception does
not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and
maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule…The sovereign
decision of the exception is the originary juridico-political structure on the basis of which what is
included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their meaning.”32 Assuming
that sovereignty continues to be made legible through the law, Agamben completely disrupts the
chronology of sovereignty’s coming into being by asserting that sovereignty of the law is
actualized through its self-immolation. How then, is it possible for the law to enact anything, if
30
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this enaction exists prior to its constitution as a law? Who/what enacts this, and by what
standards can this enaction be recognized as a withdrawl? Does this withdrawl not already
require some distinction between the exception and the law? Would not the operation of
sovereignty erode this distinction?
Agamben describes a sovereign whose actions appear to be self-destructive but in fact
constitute the natural being of the sovereign. Yet, given Agamben’s own description, and my
own observation of contemporary Israeli sovereignty, it would appear that for sovereignty to
remain effective and persistent in this manner, there must be some disjunction between what
sovereignty is and what sovereignty does, precisely for the very reason that sovereignty
necessarily asserts itself by exceeding its own boundaries. Agamben would perhaps argue that
regardless of whether one privileges the exception or the law in the constitution of political
sovereignty, one cannot avoid the fact that each necessarily maintains the trace of the other that
exists exterior to it.33I find it odd, then, that Agamben’s account of sovereignty is metaphysical
given the fact that sovereignty of the law is constituted by a transgression of its own existential
limits. Thus Agamben implies that sovereignty is not just a thing, but rather is mobilized through
a state of coming into, or being brought into being.34
I do not agree with Agamben that exceptionalism is intrinsic to sovereignty. However,
Agamben accurately describes how sovereignty is presented by the Israeli state. This is a
presentation that many take as a given. Through a series of overlapping geographies, the Israeli
state effects its sovereignty by declaring outside the law and beyond its own constructed
boundaries that there is no sovereignty outside the law. Yet in doing so, Israel normalizes the
very states of exception that serve as the stage on which sovereignty continues to be mobilized.
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If sovereignty operates by normalizing the exception, how is it possible for Israel to
maintain the conceit of its exceptionality and to do so in a way that further insulates that
exceptionalism from its own self-destructiveness? Agamben implies that this is possible when he
describes the sovereign as being able to strategically operate in disjunction from itself, without
actually bringing into contestation the terms of its own legibility as sovereign. Wendy Brown
argues that, “exceptionality cannot become permanent without eroding the norm defining it and
against which it functions, without replacing that norm itself and thereby forfeiting the status of
exceptionality through which sovereignty is defined.”35 The threats to states and subjects are
interiorized in order condition the sovereignty of states and subjects. But, if this is the case, then
in what sense are they threats any longer, and by what means is it possible to maintain the
conceit of them as such? If the sovereignty of states and subjects operates by normalizing their
own exceptionality, how is it possible for these entities to maintain the conceit of their
exceptionality?
Brown, like Agamben, attempts to make sense of the contradiction between the
“evanescent, protean, and depthless traits of late modern culture and politics,” and the stark
repressive power reflected by contemporary practices of walling.”36 Brown argues that these
repressive devices are constructed to enact a condition of sovereignty that is precluded by the
condition actually effected by those walls.37 Sovereignty is in this sense disclosed by the failure
of sovereign states to maintain sovereignty according to the fantasy of Schmittian politics. But
again, as I argued in my discussion of Israeli exceptionalism, these, albeit performative,
structures do not fail to normalize occupation and apartheid. The wall engenders the very
lawlessness it is built to combat. Instead of creating civil relations between those it is meant to
35
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separate, “the staging of sovereign integrity, order, and force in the face of sovereign decline
both draws upon and intensifies a xenophobic sense of nationhood among the nation’s
subjects.”38 Regardless, this wall is not even contiguous with the borders of national identity and
some of the most some of the most forceful declarations of Israeli sovereignty are made by
Israeli settlers outside of Israeli territory.39 If this is the case than there must be a mechanism that
insulates sovereignty from the lawlessness it fosters, and from its own complicity with that
lawlessness. This mechanism could be explained by a number of structural factors, including but
not limited to, the growing power lent to the Israeli state by its role in the production of global
capital, or discursive authority lent to articulations of Israeli sovereignty.
For Agamben, the placing of states and subjects on liminal space of outlawry reflects the
original political relation through which sovereignty is constituted.40 Further, the indeterminacy
of those markers that have historically served as signifiers of political sovereignty, (such as
territorial and legal borders), constitute the original and fundamental condition of sovereignty
and politics. Again, it is odd that Agamben places a premium on an original and fundamental
relation of political sovereignty when, for Agamben, sovereignty appears effective for the very
reason that sovereignty actualizes itself by disproving an obligation to the previous terms of its
own existence.41 I find these conclusions radical insofar as they challenge the notion of political
sovereignty as contingent on the clear distinction of legal and territorial boundaries, yet I believe
that they wash over the ways in which different subjects’ relationship to those boundaries are
contingent on certain political nuances (geopolitical struggle, racism and ethnic conflict, to name
a few).

38

Ibid, 94.
Shaw-Smith, Peter. "The Israeli Settler Movement Post-Oslo." Journal of Palestine Studies 23.3 (1994): 99-109.
40
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford University Press, 1998, 25.
41
Ibid, 19.
39

20
Agamben describes this position within and without the law (as norm) as a general
category for all subjects. Yet, Agamben makes a clear distinction between two paradigmatic
figures of politics, the sovereign and the sacred man. This difference, like the difference between
sovereignty’s presence and absence, or the difference between its self-assertion and selfdestruction has problematic political implications. For Agamben, both live in a state of exclusive
inclusion in relation the law, yet while the sovereign is privileged by the law that he transcends,
the sacred man is stripped of all political subjectivity and reduced to bare life by the law that
abandons him. The sacred man is included as an object of political authority, since he can be
killed without threat of punishment, but is excluded from having any agency within politics. He
cannot be sacrificed because he is already included as a sacred object of political sovereignty,
and thus his life and death are not political agency, even though they appear central to politics.42
Both the sovereign and the sacred man are bound together, like two sides of the same coin,
despite the political disparity that exists between them.43 Finally, the relationship between the
two is not contingent historically and politically specific structural factors, but rather exists
before and thus cannot be reduced to those markers of cultural or political difference by which
we might come to recognize the relationship between sovereigns and subjects. Given this, I agree
with Catharine Mills when she writes that Agamben’s writing “relegates characteristics such as
race and gender to the level of the ontic, thus setting them outside the ontological focus that
Agamben’s theorization valorizes. Secondly, in doing so, it risks abstracting too far from any
recognition of the unequal distribution of the burdens of vulnerability and violence across social,
economic and (geo)political spheres”44. Certainly the greater privilege and freedom of Israelis in
contrast to Palestinians livelihood is not intrinsic to an abstracted relationship between them.
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This difference is dependent on the normalization of structural violence. In Israel/Palestine,
privilege and oppression operate through systems of governmentality built by the Israeli state,
which sort and classify individuals on the basis of race and ethnicity. Secondly, Agamben writes
that the production of bare life and the exclusion of peoples from the political sphere is the
fundamental political act of sovereignty. Yet, he also asserts that the sacred man has no access to
political efficacy or agency.45 So the sacred man is politically meaningful and valuable to the
sovereign but is only politically valuable as a passive object of that which excludes them. I think
this is a double standard, and I think it is problematic that Agamben attempts to reduce this
double standard to metaphysical presuppositions.
This is an issue that I will discuss at greater length when my analysis of sovereignty and
exceptionalism moves to take into account how sovereignty is articulated and operates
discursively according to cultural and political norms. Given the deep asymmetry that separates
and the strong duality that binds the sovereign to the sacred man, I am generally interested in
how the assertions of sovereignty made by some states and subjects become recognized and
taken for granted, despite the fact that such assertions appear to exceed the norms through which
states and subjects are presented, and thus should threaten their intelligibility. I wish to
understand better the persistence of contemporary sovereignty, but also the repeated failure of
certain claims for self-determination and collective sovereignty. What, then are the stakes of
articulating and asserting sovereignty, and how are these risks distributed? If it is through the
withdrawl of the law from itself that sovereignty is in some way asserted and effected, than how
can this withdrawl simultaneously privilege and insulate Israeli’s while abandoning and
condemning Palestinians?

22
Take for example, once again, the case of Israeli settlement. As Eyal Weizman argues,
the vigilante justice excercised by settlers is important to the capacity of the state to maintain
supremacy at its borders. Brown argues that the blurring of the space between the exception and
the law is strategic, for the very reason that it allows states to defer on to sovereignty to those
whose actions they are not accountable to, despite the fact that this challenges the state’s
“monopoly on decisionism as well as the monopoly on violence presumed to anchor state
sovereignty”46. Individuals attempting either to take the law in their own hand, or to simply
break the law in the name of their status as citizens of a sovereignty state enact a sovereignty but
in doing so challenge the legal norms and territorial boundedness to which that sovereignty is
supposedly obligated. 47 If a vigilante is someone who takes the law into their own hands, then it
is already implied that the vigilante is some way free to do so and therefore outside of the law.
The Israeli state and Israeli settlers are able to more comfortably assert their sovereignty as
outlaws, but remain insulated by the terms of the law. They attempt make outlawry legible as a
legal norm, and this exceptionalism succeeds because of existing political and economic
structures that are exclusive and discriminatory in nature.48 If there is a risk to asserting
sovereignty in this way, then it is not a factor for those entities whose right to sovereignty is
already taken as a given.49
Agamben’s theory seems to undercut the efficacy of a critique of contemporary
sovereignty. However, he supplies us with some of the tools through which a critique of
exceptionanlism could be constructed. This critique would be based on the practices
demonstrated by the Agambenian sovereign, if we understand those practices to be political
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achievements and not natural qualities intrinsic to sovereignty. The sovereign’s capacity to
operate between exception and norm, and to assert its exceptionality in the name of those laws
denigrated by the exception, may be a fact of contemporary politics, but it is not necessarily the
telos of politics. Further, the legibility of this assertion of exceptionality cannot be taken for
granted, especially if one takes into account the failure of Palestinians to effectively challenge
the Israeli exceptionalism, through claims to Palestinian sovereignty. By attempting to
rationalize this fact, or what Agamben calls “the paradox of sovereignty,” one opens up the
possibility of critically redeploying that paradox in ways that are effectively empowering. With
this in mind I would like to return to my description of exceptionalism, focusing now on how
Israeli sovereignty is articulated in the context of cultural norms.
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Chapter 2
Cultural Exceptionalism and Zionist Narratives: Articulations of Israeli Sovereignty As
Operating in Relation to Cultural Norms
Cultural exceptoinalism describes the phenomenon by which certain cultural norms are
exceeded in the assertion of those norms. Consequently, to say that a certain identity is
exceptional is to, as Puar argues, imply that those individuals paradigmatically conform to and
maintain a mastery over cultural norms.50 Thus, cultural binaries that tend to discriminate
between Israelis and Palestinians are effective in asserting the supremacy of certain identities
partially because they exceed the norms of identification. Like those material and legal partitions
that mobilize Israeli sovereignty, the Arab/Jew binary is not effective at discriminating against
Palestinians because it forestalls all movement across it. Rather, it and they are effective because
they normalize the capacity for Israelis to transgress those norms while remaining insulated by
them. I draw a parallel between articulations of Israeli identity of the sovereignty of Israeli law,
as Israeli sovereignty is increasingly tied to issues of cultural and ethnic belonging. The
articulation of Israel as a state of and for the Jews implies that the sovereignty of Israel is
contingent on the purity and determinacy of the state’s “Jewish character.”51 However, I argue
that in the attempt to assemble a determinate Jewish “people” from which the Israeli state would
receive its authority, that this notion of a “Jewish people” already exceeds the mobilization of
Israeli sovereignty. In this sense the indeterminacy of the Jewish/Arab binary may appear as a
threat to Israeli sovereignty, and it is often presented as such. However these cultural norms are
effective insofar as they already include the exception to those norms. This is demonstrated by
50
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the appropriation of some Arab identities as “Jewish” and the exclusion of other Arab identities
as “Palestinian.” These latter identities are treated as a threat to the state’s “Jewish” character.
There is perhaps no greater irony to the citation of porous borders as justification for
Israel’s lawlessness, than Israel’s openness to the world’s Jewish population. Despite the fact I
am not technically Jewish according to Orthodox Law, I would have much less difficulty
obtaining Israeli citizenship than a Palestinian Arab born and raised in the capital of Israel. The
relationship of Diaspora to the Zionist rhetoric of the state reflects, as Helga Tawil-Souri
observes, a contradictory logic of “not having stated borders but wanting to defend them.” She
writes that, “Israel is a ‘de-bordered’ state insofar as it is the nation for the world’s Jews, not
simply for Israelis who may or may not be Jewish, such as the 20% of the population within
‘Israel proper’”52. Israel’s borders are consistently penetrated, as dictated by the Zionist state’s
claim to sovereignty. This claim at once enacts Israeli sovereignty as a solution to and negation
of the Jewish Diaspora. The Zionist state’s claim to popular sovereignty operates as an
unconditional claim in the name of the Jewish people, despite the fact that it is not a state
representative of the entire Jewish population. This claim is a productive one insofar as the
Jewish identity of the Israeli state is asserted as an exceptional claim, necessitated by the fact that
the Jewish population exceeds the Israeli state’s claim as the state of the Jews. It is not simply a
description of what already exists but rather a claim which owes its force and momentum to the
exceptional situation facing a the Jewish people, a situation that if the Israeli state were to
actually solve would threaten the unconditionality of its claims to sovereignty. As a result, the
Israeli state continues to articulate its sovereignty as that which is yet to be realized, not because
it cannot be realized, but because it is threatened by the presence of the Palestinian “other.” What
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this reveals is not simply precarity of the “Jewishness” of the Jewish state, but that such precarity
is employed maintain the unconditionality of the Israeli right to sovereignty. The claim that
Jewish people require a state is bolstered by the condition of being a people without a home (a
condition shared by many Palestinians), which is potentially problematic insofar as a diasporic
condition is antithetical to statehood. Again, we see that the dissolution of sovereignty as
presented by the Israeli state helps to mobilize a sovereignty that does not really operate
according to the cultural norms that it cited as its foundation for existence. This is perhaps why
Agamben attempts to link the dissolution of sovereignty to its persistence and rearticulation, as
the condition of sovereignty’s self presentation according to certain norms is both undermined
and animated by that assertion.
The ambiguous and volatile relationship between Zionism and diaspora reflect a
perversely constitutive relationship between what affirms and threatens Jewishness. It is in the
name of its very negation, that the exceptionality of the diasporic condition is asserted.53
Consequently the Diaspora is an efficacious and malleable political instrument, and as an
inviolable icon of the Jewish experience. Palestinian critics, such as Joseph Massad, have
attempted to challenges the monopoly that Zionists narrative have on the diasporic experience,
by bringing to light Zionism’s own fraught relationship to that history. Such attempts are
upsetting to the image of Israel as a “western outpost on a eastern front.” This image is
politically strategic because it is paradoxical, and because it allows the Israeli states and subjects
to articulate the sovereignty of identity as that which both exceeds and paradigmatically
conforms to the limits, parameters and obligations of national belonging54. To be like a Western
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nation state Zionism must eventually give up the exceptionality lent to the Israeli state by the
Jewish diaspora. Yet it is the diasporic history of the Jews that makes their claim to statehood
legible and legitimate, at the “unfortunate” cost of the Palestinian Diaspora. Zionism, in its
operations, both excludes the diaspora as an obstacle to the realization of Israeli identity, and
includes the diaspora as a venerable token of Israeli exceptionalism.
While articulations of Israeli national and cultural belonging exclude the Arab other as
that, which poses an existential threat to Jewish/Israeli identity, the Arab-Palestinian remains
integral to the operation of the Zionist master narrative. It is the threat and obstacle of the
Palestinian “other” that is cited to prove both the exceptional vulnerability and perseverance of
the Jewish way of life.55 On the other hand, “they” are objectified and fetishized as keys to
accessing Jewish origins. Within narratives of Zionism, “arabness,” both in the figure of the
Palestinian and in the figure of the Arab Jew, is an object of desire. Arab Jewish scholar and
activist Ella Shohat writes that, “The Arab was perceived as the incarnation of ‘the ancient, preexiled Jews’, ‘the Semitic not yet corrupted by wanderings in exile’, and therefore, to a certain
extent, an authentic Jew. The projection of the Arab as preserving archaic ways, and rootedness
in the land of the Bible, in contrast with the landless ghetto Jew, provoked a qualified
identification with the Arab as the desired object of imitation for Zionist youth in
Palestine/Israel, and as reunification with the remnant of the free and proud ancient Hebrew”56.
Arab identity becomes in appropriated in the assertion of Israeli’s as culturally hybrid and
multicultural. Later I will discuss how this presentation of cultural hybridity is key to the
articulation of Israeli’s as more progressive than Palestinians.
It is this obsession with historical origins as an object to be discovered and selectively
55

Massad, Joseph Andoni. The persistence of the Palestinian question: Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians.
Taylor & Francis, 2006, 35.
56
Ibid, 226.

28
celebrated that informs Zionism’s denial of the presence of Palestinians as an agentic subject of
history. This is after all the already contradictory logic of the Zionist project, to colonize and
conquer its origins, and to construct a “new” Jewish subject in the name of a condition that it
wishes to negate. This inclusion as object and exclusion as subject is integral to the operation of
Orientalist discourse in general. As Edward Said writes, quoting the scholar Anwar Abdel Malek
“This ‘object’ of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a
historical’ subjectivity, above all, nonactive, -nonautonomous, non-sovereign with regard to
itself: the only Orient or Oriental or ‘subject’ which could be admitted, at the extreme limit, is
the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to itself, posed,
understood, defined-and acted- by others”57. If any Palestinian figure is written into narratives of
Zionism, it is the “terrorist,” who carries an “unwarranted” and murderous desire to annihilate
the Jewish state. As I will discuss later in my analysis of political norms, this image of
Palestinian resistance also bolsters the claim that Israel serves as a bastion of secular
progressiveness in the Middle East (despite its ethnocentric policies). This Islamophobic
stereotype only further animates the Orientalist discourse that reduces the Palestinian subject to
“objective” investigations of Islamic or “Arab” history and culture, while effacing the violent
marks that the history of Zionism has left on the Palestinian subject.
The Palestinian and the Arab Jew are both internal others of Zionist discourse. The dual
restriction and appropriation of othered subjects into the Zionist narrative in ways mirrors
deployment of European diasporic Jewishness in those narratives. Through both, Zionism
negatively articulates its own sovereign coherence, capturing what it excludes in the act of
negation. Both Joseph Massad and Ella Shohat are interested in the complex combination of
investment in and exclusion of the Arab Jew in Zionist discourse. In the Persistence of the
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Palestinian Question, Massad writes about movements of resistance among Mizrachi Jews, and
is especially interested in their identification with the American Black Panther Party.58 Even
within the confines of legible Jewishness, articulations of the democratic sovereignty of a Jewish
nation are made hollow by the exclusion of its own recognized people.59 The structural racism
experienced by Arab Jews exhibits the dark shadow of Zionism’s celebration of the Jew as a
multicultural and diasporic subject. I would argue that Palestinians living within Israel are not
second-class, but rather third class citizens. The racism experienced by Arab Jews challenges the
idea that it is possible to unproblematically appropriate cultural hybridity as a slogan of Israeli
superiority. I would like to make clear however, that although it is possible to draw similarities
between the role of Palestinians and Arab Jews in the Zionist master narrative because of their
“arabness,” their access to legibility and legitimacy within a discourse of national and collective
sovereignty remains strikingly different.
Arab Jews are not subject to the same kind of exclusive inclusion as Palestinians in
relation to Israeli identity. For Palestinians, their diasporic history is something that is
consistently denied by the Zionist narrative, perhaps for the reason that the Israeli state claims a
monopoly on diaspora. I find Joseph Massad’s critique of cultural exceptionalism exciting
insofar as his critique attempts to challenge exceptionalism by implicating Zionism in its
capacity to selectively valorize and condemn practices of identity, and in particular the diasporic
experience. He writes that “the project of Zionism proved to be two fold, in transforming the Jew
into the anti-Semite or “anti-Jew” as Israeli clinical psychologist Beit-Hallahmi posited), it
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became necessary to transform the Palestinian Arab into the disappearing European Jew”60. This
statement is indeed controversial (and a bit reductive). Yet, it serves as a tactical response to
many Zionist narratives that depict Palestinians as both desiring diaspora and yet desiring to
retake the Jewish state. I am reminded of the once popular retelling of the 1948 war, in which
Palestinians were described as abandoning their own homes, so as to prepare an invasion force
with which to “drive the Jews into the sea.” This story bolsters the depiction of Israelis as both
vulnerable and inviolable. It negates the causal link between Israeli statehood and Palestinian
diaspora at the same time that it wishes to use the threat of Palestinian resistance as justification
for the aggressive outlawry and exceptionalism of the Israeli state. Consequently, Zionist rhetoric
refuses to recognize the Palestinian diaspora, as its legibility as such would be seen as an affront
to the authority of Jewish history. And yet, despite this, Zionist rhetoric also licenses state
practices that further normalize the diasporic condition of Palestinians in an attempt to negate the
diasporic condition of the Jewish people.61
Understanding that the Israeli sovereign is increasingly identified in reference to a
cultural totality, I would argue that the actual assertion of sovereignty is animated by cultural
norms that are exceeded by this assertion. And as Israeli sovereignty increasingly attempts to
assert its exceptional acts, or conditions as norms in and of themselves, the line between
distinction between norm and exception becomes increasingly troubled. This is similar to what
the Agambenian sovereign has demonstrated. By attempting to operate strategically within and
without its own limits the law appears to undermine itself and in a sense destroy itself, in its very
assertion. This is what Massad is referring to when argues that Zionism is fraught with a
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resentment of diasporic Jewish identity. However, it is a fact of contemporary politics that, while
cultural exceptionalism strategically mobilizes Israeli sovereignty under the conceit of
vulnerability, for Palestinians, this same dynamic constitutes a double bind. It is difficult for
Palestinians to assert the exceptionality of their own experience when many still consider it antiSemitic for Palestinians to openly identify with history of the Jewish diaspora, or to at least draw
a parallel between the Jewish and Palestinian diaspora, even though they are expected to
recognize that history as paradigmatic it in order to make their own suffering legible. In
conforming to discursive norms of political intelligibility, Palestinians attempting to make their
claims to national sovereignty legitimate must undercut the potency of that very claim by
recognizing Jewish exceptionality.62 “The state of racist exception,” writes Nadia Abu-El Haj,
permeates this structure of command: as scholars, as critics, even as Palestinians who have paid a
dear price for Israel’s existence, we must reassure you, one of the most militarily powerful states
on earth, of your right to exist”63. We are faced with a series of questions similar to those ones
implicated in the operation of legal exceptionalism. How is it possible that for some, the attempt
to exceed the recognized norms of belonging proves their exceptionality and thus the sovereignty
of those norms, while for others such a fact constitutes a failure to conform to certain norms from
which they are already excluded?
More recent articulations of Israeli sovereignty have grafted contemporary civilizational
discourses on to the Zionist narrative and consequently have colonized the language of
democracy, popular sovereignty, and political pluralism so as to operate as a modality of
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exclusion. Consider one academic’s assertion that in the post 9/11 era “we are all Israelis”64In
this sentence exceptionality and normativity overlap. The “we” being referred to in this statement
is inclusive insofar as it sets the limits of Israeli identity beyond the most secular notions of
Jewishness. Yet it is that very act of inclusion that proves and affirms a much more pervasive
form of exclusion. This “we” could perhaps be extended to “we democrats,” or “we people
progressive nations,” or “we people of western nations,” despite the fact that Israel is neither
democratic, progressive, nor in the West. The operation of the principles of democratic and
popular sovereignty as signifiers of national, cultural or even racial belonging, brings into relief
one of the more insidious development of Israeli exceptionalism, its robbing of Palestinians of
the political language to which they are expected to conform. The image of Israel as both Jewish
and Democratic, or as the only democracy in the Middle East exemplifies this double standard.
I am interested in theories of identity and sovereignty that conceptualize both as that
which is neither revealed as an already naturally existing (or not existing) totality, nor
orchestrated and reorchestrated in every moment. Rather I wish to conceptualize sovereignty and
identity as that which is mobilized through action, and assertion. Consequently I would like to
understand those norms under sovereignty as being enacted. The effectiveness of this
mobilization of one’s identity through enaction and the determination of one’s supposedly selfdetermined self sets the stage for future assertions. This effectiveness is not predetermined by the
objective existence of that which the claim refers to. However neither is it completely contingent
on the will of the individual, as claims of identity are deeply structured by existing norms of
recognition. There are high political and material stakes to the assertion of sovereignty and
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identity65. In the case of Israel assertions of sovereignty are tied to the assertions of particular
identities, and both require recognition. Judith Butler writes that “to be addressed is not merely
to be recognized for what one already is, but to have the very term conferred by which the
recognition of existence becomes possible…One ‘exists’ not by virtue of being recognized, but,
in a prior sense, by being recognizable”66. Consequently, there are two risks involved when an
individual or totality asserts itself. These are risks that cannot necessarily be taken into account
or calculated in advance by a unitary subject, yet these risks shape the development of different
tactics through which political subjectivity is constituted, challenged, or reinforced.67
Primarily there is a risk that the assertion of sovereignty or identity will not be recognized
or deemed legible. Perhaps this is because it is revealed to be an enaction, as not complying with
the norms of what is being asserted, as I have attempted to argue that the force of the enaction
necessarily exceeds those norms in order to effective. It is also often if not always the case that
questions of legibility and recognition are not immanent to those attempting to receive
recognition. I would argue that the latter is often the case with Palestinian claims for collective
sovereignty, where visibility and legibility is constant struggle against the power of Zionist
rhetoric. Secondly, as Judith Butler observes in “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in the
act of having one’s performance recognized one risks being, “re-colonized under which [they]
write”68. Regardless of how these risks are distributed, we can say that identity is neither an
objective thing nor a subjective choice. Rather, it is practice that transforms the subject in the
process of identification, but does not necessarily subsume that subject.

65

Zivi, Karen. "Rights and the Politics of Performativity." Precarious Politics: Critical Encounters (2008): 157-169,
163.
66
Ibid, 162
67
Ibid, 163.
68
Butler, Judith. "Imitation and Gender Insubordination1." Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader (2006):
255.

34
I argue that Israeli sovereignty operates through unequal distribution these risks between
Israelis and Palestinians. In Israel/Palestine the risks of having one’s claims validated are much
less for Israeli articulations of sovereignty and identity. Thus, Palestinians are much more reliant
on the determinacy of a personal and collective sovereignty, and consequently the personal and
collective identities through which sovereignty is increasingly articulated. The recognition of
Israel’s identity as a sovereign democratic and pluralistic state is in no way threatened by its
ethnocentric policies. Nor do the progressive platitudes of the Israeli state appear to harm the
privilege experienced by white Jews in Israel. Rather, the Israeli state attempts to normalize its
own exceptional practices while it continues to argue that its claims to sovereignty are
unconditional, due to the extreme situation facing the Jewish people. It is in these cases that
identity as a practice, and not as a natural constant, is a cause for celebration. For Israelis, these
practices prove the unreifiability and exceptionality of the identity disclosed, while they
simultaneously affirm the efficacy of identification as exceptional. In this context practices that
challenge the presence of an “empirically determined subject”69 becomes celebrated as an ethos
of outlawry that is perpetuated by the Israeli state. Parallel to the fact that vigilantism has is a
strategic mode by which to effect sovereignty both within and without the law, the presentation
of Jewish Israeli identity as multicultural and thus transgressive in its relation to cultural binaries
insulates Zionist claims to the exceptionality and inviolability of Jewish identity from the effects
of those claims.
In the case of Palestinian claims, the disjunction between the norms through which
sovereignty and identity is asserted, and the actual force of that assertion, underscores the
inability to have one’s own claims recognized according to existing norms. I will discuss this
more in depth when I tackle the question of political norms and their growing intimacy with
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cultural binaries. I will say that tactically, this dilemma reflects a double bind. The demands of
recognition are structured in such a way that one remains jammed between the desire to
effectively assert ones sovereignty according to certain cultural and political norms and the
desire to have those norms recognized. Consequently, Zionist articulations of Israeli Jewish
identity are able to strategically play with the Jewish/Arab binaries, while Palestinians are
condemned both for attempting to include themselves within narratives of the Jewish experience
and are chastised for being unable to accept a more pluralistic practices of identification. Given
this double bind, some theorists have advocated for practices of identity that look to sites of
cultural hybridity in order to reappropriate the tactics of exceptionalism. These theorists, having
already having recognized that cultural binaries are being transgressed and played with for the
sake of maintaining Israeli privilege, attempt to reclaim hybridity for the sake of progressive
politics.
To say that identity is often implicated in certain practices of hybridity is to imply that
there is a paradoxical intimacy and disjunction between identity, and the capacity of identity to
be asserted effectively. In other words, identity and sovereignty both constitute and challenge the
integrity of the other. Consequently, identity always appears tainted by that either exceeds or
fails to conform to its own terms. If, in order to maintain the sovereignty of identity, the
individual or collective subject described must exceed the terms of description, then this identity
necessarily implicates that which is excluded from the terms of description. In Parting Ways:
Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Butler argues both that hybrid identities are already
implicated within the Zionist project and that it may be possible to embrace hybridity as a way to
affirm or celebrate Jewishness without continuing to privilege Jewish identity. In this sense,
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Butler’s work is aligned with some of the later work of Edward Said70. For Butler, the
understanding of Jewishness as suffering from a necessary impurity or mixing with otherness,
opens up new directions in identitarian politics71. Butler’s project resonates with Said’s
occasional identification as a “Jewish Palestinian,” which underscored his attempt to lay the
foundations for a bi-national project of popular sovereignty as well as to make legible the
discursively invisibilized markings of Jewish identity on the Palestinian subject. Butler is just as
interested in uncovering the “arabness” within her Jewish identity, as Said is in uncovering the
“jewishness” in his Arab identity. Butler is particularly excited with Said’s work Freud and the
Non-European, which celebrates Moses as both a foundational and excluded figure for the very
reason that he was an “Arab Jew.” For Said, the foundational figure challenges the identitarian
boundaries that are constructed in the name of that very foundation.72
Indeed Said’s assertion as a Jewish Palestinian is highly enactive. In fact, it appears at
first glance so performative that it is unlikely to receive recognition as anything other than
disrespectful to those who feel an intimacy with a collective Jewish identity. However, I believe
Butler’s own attempt to reclaim alterity within Jewish thought is more likely to be read as
progressive (or at least less likely to be read as anti-Semitic) because she has the privilege of
challenging Zionist conceptions of Jewish supremacy through Jewish resources.

Butler is

concerned with this fact. She observes that “by claiming there is a significant Jewish tradition
affirming modes of justice and equality that would, of necessity, lead to a criticism of the Israeli
state, I establish a Jewish perspective that is non-Zionist, even anti-Zionist, at the risk of making
even the resistance to Zionism into a “Jewish” value and so asserting, indirectly, the exceptional
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ethical resources of Jewishness”73. Edward Said has a different problem. His attempt to
appropriate alterity for the sake of recognizability as both a victim and a subject of Zionist
hegemony, not only triggers backlash for appearing anti-Semitic, but also contradicts the dual
claim that Palestinians constitute a “real” and homogenous people, and that they are deserving of
political self-determination. Particularly instructive is Joseph Massad’s critique of Said in this
case. He argues that Said’s attempt to challenge cultural exceptionalism by appropriating the
alterity already play in the operation of cultural supremacy may put too much faith in the ability
for creative self-expression to realize a post-nationalist form of citizenship, or a post-racial form
of identity. Massad points out that such connections between Jewish and Palestinian suffering
can be made, but can only be made “rhetorically.”74 This may seem odd given Massad’s even
more controversial attempts to challenge Jewish exceptionalism by making those rhetorical
connections. I would argue, however, that Massad’s attempt is more openly aware of the limits
placed on such statements as a result of their rhetorical nature and reductive tendency, and for
that reason is much more the effective than Said’s attempt to, as Hochberg explains “go across
but do not enforce the lines of separation”75. Massad takes into account what Shohat refers to as
the “Israeli monopoly over representations of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.”76 I am inclined to
support this critique given that Zionist narratives have already deployed those identifications that
transgress the Arab/Israeli binary in order to assert the progressiveness of Israeli’s in contrast to
Palestinians. It would be much more accurate to say that these practices of cultural hybridity in
fact underline an objectification and fetishization of Arab Culture and Arab subjects within
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Zionist narratives, despite the lack of recognition received by Arab Palestinians in those
narratives.
What I am attempting to call attention to the site of disjunction between the fact of
identity or the fact of sovereignty, and the force implicated in the assertion of identity and
sovereignty. This is perhaps most clear in the case of rights claiming, especially when those
rights are claimed on behalf of a certain common identity.77 Yet it is also in cases of rights
claiming where the legibility of the fact of one’s own personal or collective identity becomes
increasingly important for making claims to political rights and to political sovereignty. Some
critique theories of identity that emphasize the necessary incompleteness, or indeterminacy of
identity for “positively undermining emancipatory politics [and] with threatening the theoretical
and strategic resources essential to responding to and transforming relations of inequality and
injustice”78. Perhaps Israeli exceptionalism is a good example of why some people feel this way.
However, I do not think this is the fault of these theories of identity in principle, but rather
certain structural factors that we can identify, such as the Israeli monopoly on discourse. These
factors explain how some emancipatory politics are often undermined in this way, while other
privileged claims to sovereignty continue to persist.
With this in mind I would like to critically engage the unequal access that Palestinian
and Israeli subjects have to legibility homogenous people and as a people deserving of political
sovereignty. The former is particularly important in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, where
sovereignty is often talked of in ethnic and racial terms. Some political norms have become tied
to cultural norms in paradoxical ways. Take for example, the misnomer that identifies the state’s
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Jewish character as a predicate of its “democratic character.” This identification demonstrates
how certain people and states have colonized principles and practices, which are often
recognized for their attempt to destabililize rigid articulations of identity. This phenomenon is
demonstrated by the “clash of civilizations” thesis, which identifies “democracy,” among other
political norms, to be a culturally specific phenomenon, but then bolsters the supremacy of
western culture by merit of democratic theory’s characteristic claim to universality and plurality.
Many of the theories of subject and sovereignty discussed in this paper attempt to show how the
operation of pluralistic and democratic entities is haunted by the practices of sovereignty that
pluralism and democracy are meant to do away with. However, this continues to privilege certain
political norms (such as democracy and pluralism) that cannot easily if at all be detached from
cultural norms, or from the sovereign practices that exceed those political norms.
So, in discussing the differences in how Israeli and Palestinian articulations of
sovereignty are structured according to cultural and political norms, I will continue to engage
theories of identity and sovereignty that wish to challenge the determinacy and completeness of
the subject. More specifically, I am interested in those theorists that recognize and deal with an
intimacy between the target of critique and the subject who is poised to subvert or challenge that
object of critique, and thus an intimacy between practices of self-determination and practices of
subjection. Given this seemingly inescapable duality, we are faced with the question of whether
it is possible to, and whether it is efficacious to attempt to separate the two. This question
proliferates a number of ethical questions regarding the relationship between theory and praxis.
We remain faced with certain problems regarding attempts to theorize exceptionalism so
as to effectively challenge it. These theories, which see a potential for radical resignification in
the hybridity or the enactive quality of identity, tend to remain attached to progressive
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shibboleths, which, far from challenging the binary between Israelis and Palestinians, would
simply abstract from the difference which structures Israeli and Palestinian claims. By theorizing
exceptionalism in order to recognize and normalize the indeterminacy between the exception and
the norm already at play, one risks undermining the recognizability of certain claims for
individual rights and collective sovereignty while at the same time freeing other previously
recognized identities and sovereignties from the obligation to their own claims of exceptionality.
With this in mind I would like to finish my analysis of exceptionalism as it operates through
political norms.
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Chapter 3
Political Exceptionalism and the “failure” of Israeli Democracy: Israeli Sovereignty as
Operating in Relation to Political Norms
In the case of Israel Palestine it is increasingly difficult to separate cultural and political
norms, and so I will attempt to discuss specifically the operation of political norms without
repeating myself too much. By political norms, I refer to terms by which certain states and
subjects are said to conform to certain political identities. Specifically, I am interested in the
qualification of the Israeli state as progressive and/or democratic, and Israeli identity as
singularly multicultural and diasporic. In describing Israeli exceptionalism, it has been partially
priority to describe in detail the principles on which Israeli sovereignty is supposedly made
contingent. Lawfulness, the determinacy of borders, the purity of Jewish character, and finally a
democratic and progressive ethos are articulated as the principles and conditions of Israeli
sovereignty. I have attempted to demonstrate in these cases, the actual operation of sovereignty
makes unintelligible those conditions and denigrates those principles, and yet in some sense
conditions the continued operation and re-articulation of sovereignty. Indeed, the authoritarian
acts of the Israeli state continue to be justified in the name of popular sovereignty, or democracy.
Consequently, these acts evacuate that language of their meaning and political efficacy, at least
for some. Palestinians, attempting to articulate “legitimate” modes of popular sovereignty as
resistance to occupation, are made more dependent on that language that the Israeli state has
already exceeded.79 Let us take for example the increasingly ubiquitous and unquestioned truism
that Israel is both Jewish and Democratic. This claim plays strategically with the indeterminate
spaces between the exception and the norm. “Israel,” write Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail B.
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Bakan “is commonly identified as a state without comparison, framed in international politics as
the only “Jewish” state, and one that is claimed to be exceptionally “democratic” in the context
of the Middle East”80. Although democratic popular sovereignty is at times valorized on the
condition of its universality and its unconditional inclusiveness, some of us remain more
democratic than others. Inclusiveness as a marker of identity becomes appropriated for the sake
of exclusive practices of political sovereignty and of cultural, ethnic, and racial supremacy.
The coding of Palestinians as fundamentalist, reactionary sets certain standards of
“legitimate” Palestinian statehood and representation. Consequently Palestinian claims for selfdetermination are painted as unpragmatic and outlandish claims and therefore illegitimate.81
Israel is not subject to these same expectations, while they still profit from the conceit of the
Israeli state as a paradigm of liberal statehood in an otherwise illiberal environment. A double
standard is also demonstrated by the expectations placed on non Jewish Arab representatives of
Israel within the Knesset. Their presence perhaps serves as an avatar of Israeli democracy,
popular sovereignty, and a general ethos of inclusiveness. Yet it is through that very mechanism
of “inclusion” and “democratic representation” that channels of Palestinian representation are
captured as that which can be cited to prove the inefficacy of Palestinian popular sovereignty,
and prove the inviolability of Israeli popular sovereignty. According to Israeli domestic law, all
Arab representatives in the Knesset and all Arab political parties can be rejected if they do not
reject the Zionist definition of Israel as a “Jewish State”82. Consequently “legitimate” forms
Palestinian representation in fact “confine legitimate change to the boundaries defined by the
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Zionist consensus and anchor them in constitutional law”83. Yet in doing so Palestinian
representatives are immediately alienated from their position as representatives. Popular
representation for the Arab citizens of Israel is undercut by the very terms of that representation
being recognized.
Joseph Massad suggests that “If we were to use a metaphor in order to describe the
hegemonic Western discourse vis-a-vis Palestinians, we would see it as a discursive space that
places Palestinians on its border, faced with checkpoints that mainly keep us out but do allow
some entry.”84 The image of the checkpoint is useful insofar as it demonstrates a parallel
between how political subjects are produced materially and how those subjects are produced
discursively. The checkpoint marks a liminal space and leaky space. It is a space where
sovereignty operates in a permanent state of incompletion, in the failure for it to actualize its own
goals, and so as not to negate the foil of its existence. In this space the qualities and practices that
are at times valorized by many post-modern thinkers appear to be implicated in the violation of
individual subjects. However, these theorists maintain that it is for this very reason that such
qualities describe the most strategic way to negotiate effectively with relations of domination. A
politics that attempts to embrace he notion of sovereignty in this way, can be read as hopeful,
perhaps to a fault. If sovereignty is already operating in a state of its own incompleteness, then
the terms by which sovereignty is defined are to some extent in contest. Karen Zivi writes that it
is because the assertion of personal and collective sovereignty increasingly exceeds the norms
through which it presents itself, that “terms and norms can be invoked and cited in ways that
exceed and help shift dominant ways of thinking, being and doing. This makes a performative
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politics a hopeful politics”85. We have also seen however, that a politics of this kind is implicated
in the ability of sovereignties and the bearers of particular identities to not only exceed the norms
of sovereignty or identity, but to attempt to normalize such exceptions in the name of their own
legibility as that sovereignty or identity. This duality is well demonstrated by Derrida’s writing
on sovereignty and democracy.
I would like to focus on the relation between sovereignty and democracy. Democracy is
asserted as a practice of politics that challenges the kind of unconditional sovereignty, which in
the case of Israel, has been licensed by such assertions. In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason,
Derrida writes on the contemporary phenomenon of the “Rogue State” (État Voyou), that asserts
sovereignty through the manipulation of political norms that are antithetical to the way in which
sovereignty continues to operate. These states are characteristic for “appearing not to respect the
mandates of international law, the prevailing rules and force of law of international deontology,
such as the so-called legitimate and law-abiding states that interpret them in accordance with
their own interests”86. Exceptionalism demonstrates the kind of roguishness that Derrida argues
to be ubiquitous in self-declared “democratic” states.
Derrida’s describes there to be an intimacy between sovereignty and democracy that is
aporetic, partially because democracy, asserts its sovereignty in under and in the name of an
identity that is often corrupted by its very assertion. Yet, Derrida implies that for this reason the
relationship between democracy and sovereignty is integral to the persistence of both. The
concept of democracy has always been controversial for the reason that it is difficult, as Derrida
points out, “to distinguish, with regard to free will, between the good of democratic freedom or
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liberty and the evil of democratic license”87. Despite the fact that the term “democracy” is often
articulated as a universal and unconditionally inclusive concept, the presentation of Israeli policy
as an attempt to protect or preserve democracy implies that democracy can only be effective
when it is bounded. This is odd given that those same policies licensed in the name of preserving
democracy further disrupt the boundedness of Israeli sovereignty. The operation of sovereignty
becomes an obstacle to the actualization of truly democratic practice, although democracy is
understood as necessarily linked to some sort of sovereignty through which it can be actualized.
Thus democracy continues to be asserted by sovereign nations as an incomplete project, as a
promise for something that is yet to come. Yet, this promise is attractive for the very reason that
it refuses to restrict itself to any conditions based on previous promises, and thus remains
attached to a sovereignty that exceeds the political norm to which it fails to conform. Derrida
agrees, further arguing that the will of people can only be effectively represented by some
sovereignty, which is not directly reducible to the people, and which is in some sense outside of
the people, an “other,” of the people88, but that cannot be truly exorcised from the people in the
attempt to bring about Democracy. So, although Democracy stakes its claim to sovereignty on its
identification with democracy, democratic practices remain implicated in practices of exclusion,
surveillance, security and larger structures which simultaneously signify the failure of
democratic practice, and the promise for a principled democratic practice.
This account is persuasive, but Derrida’s use of the abstract “other” problematically
suggests a symmetry that obscures the fundamentally asymmetrical dynamics of exceptionalism.
This usage also abstracts from the difference between more principled forms of democratic
practices, and what I observe to be clear perversions of democracy. Indeed, I agree with Derrida
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that democracy often operates on its own threshold, but that does not mean we can come to say
that certain states are “democratic” for the very reason that they are not democratic. Both the
Israeli settler and the Palestinian are examples of border figures, in whose name Israeli
sovereignty is articulated. This occurs despite that those figures are conditioned at the threshold
of Israeli sovereignty by its very operations. However, to equate the Israeli Settler with the
Palestinian in this case is problematic, despite the fact that Derrida abstracts from this difference
in order to critique state exceptionalism.
For Derrida, popular sovereignty enables self-determination. In order for a subject,
(whether personal or collective), to be its self, and to actualize its self-determination, that subject
must exceed its self in the process. Consequently, to assert collective self-determination is to
assert a sovereignty of the people that must necessarily exceeds the people. Derrida writes that,
“there is no freedom without ipseity and, vice versa, no ipseity without freedom—and, thus,
without a certain sovereignty”89. The borders of identity through where the sovereignty of states
and subjects is asserted are necessarily exceeded by the capacity to protect or defend those
borders. Thus ipseity, or self-identity is exceeded by self-identification. This is what the
exceptional state seeks to normalize. It seeks to maintain the conceit of its exceptionality despite
the fact the assertion of sovereignty necessarily makes indeterminate the distinction between the
exception and the norm. Yet, if we affirm Derrida’s general point on inevitable disjointedness of
personal sovereignty and self-determination, then the claim to the rights of Palestinians or the
right to a Palestinian state, which can be posed as a challenge to Israeli exceptionalism, may
appear inevitably self-undermining for the same reason that Israeli exceptionalism continues to
persist. I would argue that this is the case because of how Palestinians are expected to prove their
political rights in ways that are not expected of Israelis.
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Derrida challenges teleological narratives of the subject so as to understand how
exceptionalism can be a constitutive force. He writes that self hood or “ipseity” is, among other
things, enactive “inasmuch as this latter still implies a power for some “I” guaranteed by
conventions that neutralize the pure eventfulness of the event, and inasmuch as the eventfulness
of the to-come exceeds this sphere of the performative”90. This “to come” is integral to Derrida’s
critique of contemporary so-called democratic sovereignty. To continue to act in the name of that
which is denigrated by those actions is for Derrida a quality of democratic popular sovereignty.
But then again, it is unclear whether Derrida’s deconstruction of popular democratic sovereignty
is a normative critique.
There is a paradox at the heart of democratic popular sovereignty, which is both
necessary for its operation and the cause of its seemingly inevitable failure. This problem mirrors
the paradox of self-identification and self-determination of the “I” or “We” that exceeds or fails
to conform to the norms of its own determination and identification. Yet if this is the case than
how can these norms continue to carry any meaning? If a democracy necessarily is effective for
the reason that it isn’t a democracy than why are we still using the term? To this Derrida would
perhaps respond with the claim that democratic sovereign both suffer from and are conditioned
by a certain “autoimmunity,” and that consequently, democracy comes in the form of a promise,
and as something that remains as that which is “to come.” Derrida writes that sovereignty “is
always in the process of positing itself by refusing itself by denying of disavowing itself; it is
always in the process of autoimmunizing itself, or betraying itself by betraying the democracy
that nonetheless can never do without it.”91 I wonder if it is possible, with Derrida’ approach, to
be supportive yet critical of the promise of an Israeli/Palestinian state that democratically
90
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represents its respective people (whatever that means), in ways which do not enforce the double
standard that Palestinians are subjected to? I am not sure, but to answer this question one must
first take into account the fact that there exists certain discursive norms that already privilege as
paradigmatically conforming to and thus superior to those norms. Consequently, identification
as “democratic” can be employed to rhetorically license the violent and the anti-democratic
practices of the Israeli state and of some of its citizens. Derrida’s writing can be read as both
apologizing for the failure of democracy, and chastising current “democracies” for not being
accountable to their identification as democratic. Because of this of this, it becomes increasingly
important to take into account the Israeli monopoly on discourse and to take into account those
structural factors that determine how sovereignty comes to be recognized according to political
norms, and to what extent states and subjects are dependent on conforming to those norms.
Derrida depicts a sovereign who operates by playing with the own question of his
existence or non-existence and thus exists—like the settlements--in a state of “temporary
permanence.” This is similar to Agamben, who depicts a sovereign that is brought about and thus
operates on the threshold of its own dissolution, insofar as the Agambenian sovereign
consistently operates by exceeding the norms of its intelligibility. However, for Derrida, this fact
is not fundamental to sovereignty, and this marks a major contrast with Agamben. I would agree,
and argue that if sovereignty appropriates the condition of its dissolution as a condition of its
own operation, that this is only effective if sovereignty is already taken given. With this in mind,
it is possible to recognize how sovereignty persists under Israeli exceptionalism, while also
recognizing how Palestinian claims to sovereignty remain unrecognized. We could recognize this
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failure to be a result, not of the failure of Palestinians to conform to the terms of political
intelligibility, but of what Joseph Massad calls “the limits of racialized discourse.”92
If we follow Derrida’s approach, then Democracy remains inextricably tied to the
sovereign who both attempts to bring about and fails to conform to democracy in principle. The
capacity for certain political formations to persist under the banner of Democratic practice, is
necessarily tied to sovereignty’s disjunction from the terms by which it identifies itself. And in a
clear way this is a good thing, as it is the failure of the Israeli state to live up to the principles it
wields as a rhetorical weapon against Palestinian claims for self-determination that informs the
space for critique. If exceptionalist states like Israel remain in some way haunted by the own
promise of democracy, or haunted by the others excluded in the name of that promise, then a
emancipatory politics would necessarily require calling attention to this fact, and exposing the
paradox at play. However, to do so would remain tied to an ideal of democratic practice, and to a
notion of democratic sovereignty without the stakes of sovereignty. This is an ideal that has
already become an instrument of state exceptionalism, and one which already reflects Israeli
privilege.
Derrida is clear that his ideas cannot, and should not be easily appropriated for the sake
of emancipatory politics. His critique targets all “militant or interminable political critique”93.
Instead we find the hope for democracy in the failure of democratic practice itself, because it is
failure that incites the outlawry that progress requires. For Derrida, democracy cannot exist
without that taste for roguishness that the Israeli government demonstrates94. In this sense, we
return to the same problem encountered by Butler’s albeit cautious celebration of hybridity and
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by post-modern theories of subject and sovereignty generally. To advocate for practices that play
with the distinction between the exception and the norm, in ways already practiced by sovereign
states and subjects, is to call attention to the unfair ethical injunction for some subjects and
sovereign states to remain obligated to those norms. However it does not necessarily challenge
the force of those norms more than it does further erode the capacity for marginalized subjects to
be recognized according to them.
A theory of politics a long these lines must take into account the extent to which
disjointed practices of subjectivity and sovereignty are insulated by existing asymmetries of
legibility. For those claiming political rights, the extent to which the success of such claims is
bolstered and not undermined by its enactive character, is ultimately structured by norms of
recognition that are not immanent to the claims themselves. So on the one hand, the claims to the
exceptional rights of the Israeli state and Israeli citizens can be bolstered by claims of
normativity (“we are all Israelis”) without undermining the special treatment that Israel receives
on the basis of its exceptionality. In contrast, the attempt to make Palestinian claims to political
rights efficacious, by arguing the exceptionality of Palestinian experience or, by comparing the
Palestinian experience to the Jewish experience according to certain norms, are both read as antiSemitic. This is because both “threaten” Israeli exceptionalism.
I would argue that those theories that purport to challenge the link between the political
efficacy of cultural and political norms, and the integrity of those norms, can be useful tools for
maintaining a sovereignty that is purportedly contingent on one’s capacity or ability to conform
to those norms. The fostering of vigilantism and outlawry, the appropriation of Arab identity in
the articulation of Israeli identity as multicultural, and denigration of democracy in practice in
the name of a democracy that remains ethnically and racially coded all demonstrate the
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incorporation of that which is stated to be exterior, for the sake of a sovereignty and identity
founded in practices of excluding the “other.” However, these unfortunate perversions of what,
for many would constitute a progressive or even emancipatory politics, cannot be reduced to any
abstract philosophical issue of sovereignty as enactive, or as fractured and incomplete. This, I
would argue, is Agamben’s fatal flaw. Instead they should be contextualized by the normative
political, discursive, and economic structures that set the terrain in which sovereignty is
practiced.
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Conclusion
In their introduction to The Subject and the Political, Jenny Edkins, and Veronique PinFat observe that in poststructuralist though the “sovereign individual”
becomes the incomplete, impossible subject, and “sovereignty” is brought into question. There
are no settled identities; the subject never achieves the completion or wholeness toward which it
strives. It remains haunted by that which has to be excluded for subjectivity to be constituted in
the first place. This subject has no respect for sovereignty or its linearities: that which is placed
on the outside-the other-turns out to be on the inside after all. In the process, time itself is
distorted. In this pictures, the subject is always in the process of being constituted; there is no
point at which however briefly, the performance is finished.95
I find this description of the post-structural political subject to resonate with my own
account of exceptionalism in several ways: the fact that sovereignty increasingly operates both
within and without the markers of its own legibility, and the fact that subjects increasingly
articulate their personal sovereignty on the borders of legal, cultural and political belonging. The
relationship between subject and sovereignty echoes across scales of political constellations. The
“sovereign individual” could signify both the individual citizen subject or the collective and
bounded Subject that is the modern nation state. Both appear as “rogues,” with a certain
“disrespect” for the norms of their own identification. As both exceed the limits of their identity
as states and subjects in their assertions of sovereignty, there remains both a strong link and a
strong disjunction between what sovereignty is and what sovereignty does. Consequently, what
sovereignty “is” increasingly appears as a performance that has no ending, and as an operation
that persists through a state of its own precarity. This is correlative with the quality of temporary
permanence through which the sovereignty of states and identities is continually asserted. The
operations of contemporary sovereignty disrupt chronologies by which those sovereign entities
are said to exist. As a result states are able to deploy the threat of their own dissolution or the
promise of their self-actualization, (according to certain norms), as the condition of their own
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operations. In a sense, sovereignty is never “itself,” but rather always operates by exceeding or
failing to conform to the norms by which one is said to be sovereign.
However, this description unfortunately misses the asymmetry implicit in this condition.
What marks the difference between failure and refusal when it comes to the operations of
sovereign entities? What is the difference between the refusal of Israelis to conform to the
political norms that already take their rights as given, and the failure of Palestinians to conform
to the political from which they are already excluded? What is the difference between the
temporary permanence of Israeli occupation, and the always-provisional authority of Palestinian
sovereignty? In Agamben’s description of sovereignty, this difference is reduced to the
incontestable distinction between the sovereign and the sacred man despite the fact that
sovereignty appears persistent for the reason that the difference between them remains in contest
and in flux. Indeed, Zionist narratives are politically efficacious insofar as they oscillate between
depiction of the Israeli state as both threatened and inviolable. The Agambenian sovereign is
tactical because he operates through exceptionalism, and because he asserts himself outside of
the norms through which his “self” is made legible. And yet, if Agamben reduces this
fragmented quality of the sovereign to a metaphysical quality intrinsic to sovereignty, then how
can there still be a strategic distinction between what sovereignty is and what sovereignty does?
Agamben’s approach undercuts all possibilities of strategizing against exceptionalism as there is
no named distinction between sovereignty is and what sovereignty does, despite the fact that his
theory appears radical for the very reason that there is demonstrated a disjunction between the
two.
Sovereignty remains effective partially because it is enactive, and thus is consistently
disclosed through certain norms but can never be kept accountable to those norms. And, when
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sovereignty increasingly asserts this exceptionality of a norm of its own operations, then it
becomes increasingly difficult keep sovereignty accountable. From where does one lodge an
effective critique of exceptoinalism, if exceptionalism operates by including what exists outside
of it, in the form of the exception, as a norm? Further, how does one recognize the indeterminacy
of those binaries that supposedly distinguish Israeli sovereignty, without obfuscating the
structural violence experienced by those excluded from Israeli privilege?
Derrida’s writing on democracy shows that within the context of political norms, there
exists a disjunction between the integrity of the identity of states and subjects, and the force
behind the assertion of those identities. In the Israel’s self-identification as “democratic,” this site
of disjunction marks both the perversion of democratic practice but also the best opportunity for
democracy to continue on into the future. Butler’s writing on a Jewish critique of Zionism shows
how, in the context of cultural norms, this disjunction marks both the persistence of Jewish
exceptionality, and the space through which that exceptionality can be effectively challenged.
Implicit in Butler’s attempt to articulate a “post-Zionist” position is both an inability to escape
and a capacity to subvert from within Zionist discourse. This term “post-Zionist” marks a future
failure to escape the terms of its own object of critique, but it also signifies a promise to
revolutionize that object of critique. Derrida, who explicitly critiques radical polemics,
understands that as political norms are increasingly identified through the capacity to exceed
norms, it becomes impossible, from the perspective of critical theory, to lodge a critique free
from the indeterminacy of exception and norm. While Agamben seems to unreasonably hold out
for a radical philosophy that transcends this problem, Butler and Derrida are perhaps to easily
willing to forgive critical theory for its failures.
What is to be done when democracy, and diaspora become identities through which the
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Israeli state attempts to justify its xenophobic and authoritarian policies? Can those concepts be
used critically without privileging the identities that colonize them? Regardless of whether this
can or should be done, I feel generally uncomfortable holding Palestinian sovereignty to the
same standards to which I hold Israeli sovereignty. This may seem contradictory given the fact
that much of this paper has been an attempt to critique the exceptional status granted to the
Israeli state and to Israeli subjects. Yet, I find myself ready to support claims for Palestinian
sovereignty and forgive those claims for their “problematic aspects,” while I am still critical of
Israeli sovereignty, even in its most apologetic forms. I find this approach strategic in because it
recognizes that Palestinian access to agency within cultural and political norms is minimal in
contrast to the privilege of Israeli voices. Similarly, I feel more inclined to celebrate Palestinian
lawlessness or forgive violence against Israeli institutions as a necessary response to the already
existing indeterminacy between exception and law, because Palestinians do in no way exert the
same agency that Israelis do in the context of that indeterminacy.
Perhaps my own practices of critique are inconsistent. They may appear to be an arbitrary
curbing of my own theoretical insights for the sake of my own standards of solidarity. This is
partially true, although I have come to this position as a result of my theoretical investigations.
Israeli claims to political sovereignty increasingly assert the unconditionality of those claims as a
norm of Israeli statehood, and consequently, critical theorists are constantly asked to curb their
own critical principles for the sake of showing solidarity with the Israeli state. Inversely,
Palestinian claims are always conditional, and are always expected to conform to certain norms
of political intelligibility. By recognizing this fact, I cannot necessarily close the gulf between
what theory says and what theory can do. Regardless, I hope that doing so will shed light on the
structural factors (both material and discursive) that effect but are in no way immanent to my
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capacity to critique them. So, at times, I support Palestinian claims in manners that may verge on
the unconditional. If I do, it is because I have been asked to do so, because Palestinians are faced
with an exceptional set of circumstances, and because so many are unwilling to recognize this
fact.
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